Above photograph taken by Cade Howard '14 of the author looking over SaiKung Harbour in the New Territories of Hong Kong.
GLISP Mid-term － For a PDF copy of this paper with all the figures, contact the author at email@example.com
What Worked in East Asia:
The Flying Geese of Industrialization
Why did growth in East Asia work? An easier question to ask might be why did development in so many other regions fail. A common answer offered by political scientists is that much of the deficiency was due to bad institutions. Developing countries had government systems which tended to extract wealth and value, rather than augment it. The developed nations of the West—the United States and Western Europe—underwent revolutions in the 18th century to overthrow their own extractive regimes and establish constitutional democracies. This healthy institutional base, among other factors, allowed for the US and Western Europe to grow into the dominant economic engines of the world during the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. In the latter half of the 20th century, Many developing nations experienced the rapid “catch-up” growth from accumulation of production factors; however, this growth proved ephemeral, as investment flowed in and out of regions seeking the highest return on investment. Productivity rates in these countries stagnated and struggled to keep up with the developed world as developing economies became mired in the so-called middle income trap or even digressed economically due to poor governance. South American nations, the former soviet satellites of Eastern Europe, West Africa, and many other regions of the world were unable to achieve substantive, sustainable development, rarely achieving consistent growth for more than a decade.1 None seemed able to replicate the West's development.
The rise of East Asia in the later half of the 20th century might offer an exception to this pattern. The East Asian growth nations exhibit a range of institutions, from the non-interventionist, colonial2 government of Hong Kong to the ultra-competitive centralized planning of Singapore, to the still nascent growth of communist-cum-capitalist China. Yet, in spite of being institutionally diverse, few would argue that Japan, and the four East Asian Tigers of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea have fully industrialized—and even post-industrial—economies approaching prosperity on level with Western nations, with China apparently fast on their heels. At developmental stages where other regions' growth was crippled by extractive governments and industrial systems, the East Asian nations have been able to pivot to more efficient institutions and policy—supported by their economic success rather than thwarted by it. Growth was not inevitable. One can look at the example of North Korea to see that geographic location was hardly the sole determinant. So what factors enabled East Asia to succeed where so many others had failed?
In spite of the wide variety of institutional arrangements within these nations, the various governments proved efficient at some very difficult tasks: they maintained fairly stable macroeconomic strategy, implemented strong educational policy, lowered birth rates, and on average narrowed the income gap between rich and poor. Most importantly, all of these nations employed adaptive industrial strategies that focused on creating comparative advantage in export industries, called Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI).
Moreover, they did not all institute EOI strategies simultaneously. Japan came first, and with the help of United States aid and firms, underwent unprecedented growth in the 1950s and 60s. From the period of 1950 to 1990, Japanese income grew on average at 5.9% per year.3 The next in line were the Four Asian Tigers: Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. As Japan moved up the industrial value chain, the void left behind was filled by the follower nations. The Flying Geese Model, first introduced by Japanese economist Akamatsu in the 1930s, explains that this meta-effect of consecutive growth within a region, can create benefits far beyond national growth strategies. This effect, in concert with EOI, is facilitating greater integration with both regional and global systems. This system allows for development and reform of both the private and public sector, while maintaining balanced growth. Most importantly for East Asia, the spill-over effects of this regional external economy creates growth beyond just factor accumulation.
This paper hopes to outline, in broad terms, an explanation as to how these two forces—EOI and the Flying Geese Model—have interacted to play a role in the development of East Asian economies and institutions, and discuss scenarios as to how this region will develop into the future.
Traditional growth economics focuses on the fundamental factors that determine development. The Solow Model, which looks at comparative levels of incomes per capita and growth rates, explains that rapid “catch-up” growth is due to differences in rates of investment, holding other variables constant.4 Economists looking at East Asia view the factors of production and their potential for growth, such as policies which encourage physical and human capital growth, geographical layout, and a large labor base. Using the Solow model as a framework, East Asian nations at the beginning of the 20th century were operating far below their steady state levels of income, which, combined with high savings rates, created a landscape fertile for growth.
High rates of savings leads to a high rate of investment, which means growing capital stocks. The nascent industries of the East Asian growth nations had relatively large, undercapitalized labor bases. In this kind of situation, investment produces high marginal returns. So in addition to high domestic saving rates, foreign direct investment was attracted to the region. Foreign money became a primary factor in the growth of the East Asian engine. As capital stocks grew, the output of these nations grew rapidly, creating a virtuous cycle as more factors of production led to higher output, which led then to high profits and subsequent reinvestment. Unlike many other developing nations, however, East Asian economies used Export Oriented Industrialization to efficiently utilize abundant factors and fund domestic growth through foreign markets.
In his introductory remarks on global trade, Adam Smith states “Though the encouragement of exportation, and the discouragement of importation, are the two great engines by which the mercantile system proposes to enrich every country, yet with regard to some particular commodities, it seems to follow an opposite plan: to discourage exportation, and to encourage importation. Its ultimate object, however, it pretends, is always the same, to enrich the country by an advantageous balance of trade.”5 Although Adam Smith first published these words in 1776, the strategy of Export Oriented Industrialization did not become realized as a distinct economic strategy until the 1950's, when it was instituted by a Japanese economy that had been practically decimated in the wake of World War II. EOI's predecessor, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), instructed countries to cut off imports and global trade in order to develop internal industries of scale. For the struggling countries of Eastern Europe and South America, the success of ISI was limited. Conversely, EOI demanded that industrial strategy be built around exportation. By cultivating industries with competitive advantage on world markets, and importing goods that were inefficient to domestically create—mostly capital and skill-intensive products—an economy can maintain an advantageous balance of trade.6 This was the strategy that propelled Japan into becoming a world economy.
The stages of EOI can be visualized as a ladder. The top of the ladder represents an advanced industrial or even post-industrial economy, while the bottom represents zero global trade activity. Each rung on the ladder represents a progressively more advanced industry with higher capital input.
The first rung of the ladder is export of primary commodities and agricultural products. This is the standard baseline state for many undeveloped countries, as it relies fully on the natural resources of a country. Manufactured goods have to be imported during this stage. This is the state of affairs for many of the least developed economies in the world. The fast developing East Asian countries were notable in this stage for two reasons. First, their institutions were strong enough to resist the parasitic presence of destabilizing foreign firms. A prime example is the so-called “Banana Republics” set up by American firms in Central America, where companies such as United Fruit set up extractive institutions to monopolize the primary commodity of these countries—in case with UF in Central America, the extracted resource was fruit. Some countries, such as China and the Philippines, set up laws requiring local ownership, or at least partnership with locals, on industrial enterprises. The second unique factor for East Asia was that many of the primary commodities cultivated for export would also be important for the more advanced stages of industrialization. The best example of this is the steel industry, which has higher growth and accounts for a higher proportion of industry in the East Asian economies than in most developing nations. Having a strong steel industry lent support to future production of electronics and machinery.7
The next rung is manufacturing of consumer products. These industries demand higher levels of capital as an input, and necessitate FDI for factories and equipment (as the developing country currently does not have the means to efficiently produce its own machinery). Many of the East Asian governments greased the wheels of international finance with various investment incentives, such as manufacturing clusters for factories (e.g. China's Specialized Economic Zones, Japan's keiretsu), which enjoy benefits and incentives such as pre-built factories and transportation infrastructure, business-friendly regulations and union protections, and advantageous geographic positioning for shipping and inputs.8 Protectionist policies, such as import tariffs, are put in place to allow for growth in nascent industries preparing for export—Import Substitution Industrialization. It is ironic that to achieve EOI, the opposite strategy has to be used to a certain extent. This is to allow time for a developing industry to establish an economy of scale and an external economy amongst firms, in order to gain global competitive advantage (assuming a forward falling supply curve) (see figure 1a and 1b for further explanation).9 This second rung, however, presents a delicate tight-rope walk for policymakers. Protectionist policies must last for just long enough to establish and industry, while not lingering for so long as to weaken competitive edge and drive up domestic prices. In Japan, as in many of the other East Asian nations, they achieved this balance through a no-nonsense bureaucracy and incentivizing quality and efficiency.
The third stage revolves around the production of capital—machinery, equipment, and technology. By producing capital for its comparative advantaged industries, a country has internalized the production chain, allowing for greater efficiency and opportunities for supply chaining.
The cycle can be exhibited through the formula D=P-E+M, where D is domestic demand, P is production, E is exports, and M is imports.10 For the first stage, P=E=0, and therefore all demand is filled through imports. Stage 2 exhibits a shift to domestic production as M decreases and P increases. A nation should transition from rung 2 to rung 3 when P is equal to M and therefore P can be exported (See figure 2 for a visual of this process).
The above three steps applies to progress within an industry utilizing EOI, but there is also a larger, meta-pattern occurring. As opposed to intra-industry growth from primary to consumer to capital production, there is also inter-industry development, as the economy evolves from primary goods to labor-intensive/low-skill manufacturing (such as textiles and clothing) to higher skill manufacturing such as consumer electronics, and on up the capital ladder. According to Dr. Terutomo Ozawa of Colorado State University, there are at least five distinct stages to the inter-industry ladder.11 The first stage he terms the natural resources intensive stage, such as primary goods. The next is physical capital intensive processing of natural resources, mostly in non-differentiated goods such as steel. Third is consumer-oriented industry, such as clothing and higher level manufacturing, such as automobiles. The fourth is R&D based industries, such as technology and biotech. Under this framework, the most developed stage is currently Information Technology.1213 Within each stage, industries enter the M-P-E cycle, however the mechanism of transitioning from one stage to the next presents considerable challenges (see figure 3 for a visual on the five stages).
In order to complete the metamorphoses into the next stage of industrial development, a country must somehow redirect investment from a mature industry into a risky, even more capital-intensive venture. A process of creative-destruction is necessary to kickstart the new industry. In East Asia, the transition is catalyzed by the Flying Geese Effect.
The Flying Geese Model, although first introduced in the 1930s in Japan, was only translated into English in the 1960s by economists trying to explain the cycles of regional growth in East Asia. FG explains that for a country to climb the industrial value chain, it must fluctuate between two strategies: diversification to newer, capital intensive industries and then a subsequent shift to rationalization, which involves attaining higher efficiency and productivity within those industries to establish global comparative advantage (see figure 4).14 The model adds a fourth rung to the EOI ladder explained above—the transition period. As a nation is shifting from rationalization to diversification in order to move to a higher-level industry, an economy can become stuck at this juncture, an example of this being the infamous “middle-income trap.”15 The situation is made even more dire by other, less developed counties out-competing with cheaper products in the mature industry due to rising labor costs and the outward flow of the capital manufactured in the home country into the new industrial territory. However, if the country can successfully transition into the higher-level industry, this “competition from below” is also the fourth ring of the ladder: importation of the now even cheaper good from less-developed nations (this could be seen as reverse ISI). This process was summarized and analyzed further by Raymond Vernon in his Product Cycle Theory of international trade.16 A nation can benefit from its prior innovation in efficient production through importing the inexpensive good.
When placed within a regional geographic structure, in this case East Asia, an industry that is rationalized and then diversified away from can then be passed to a nearby follower economy. That economy can seize the opportunity to attract investment and means of production from the former host country, along with other spillover effects, which will be covered below. During the later half of the 20th century, that flow of investment and industry knowledge started in the United States (although the US is not counted as the “first wave”), flowed to Japan, then the four Asian Tigers of Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea, subsequently towards the ASEAN nations, such as Thailand and Indonesia, and the so-called “fourth wave” in China and Vietnam. This has not been a clean transition, and coming into the 21st century the flying-V pattern is in quite a disarray as divergent domestic institutions, geography, and other factors have either assisted or impeded growth.17 Nonetheless, the flow of industry between East Asian nations was more than just capital accumulation; it created a sum bigger than its parts.
Catch-up growth though factor accumulation and trade has occurred in many developing countries. Rising capital stocks and high investment are only a part of the overall picture for East Asia. Economists have compared various factors across regions and countries to discover in what way East Asian regional growth differed.
Economic growth can be broken down into two parts: growth of factors of production— namely capital and labor—and growth of productivity. Growth in factors of production is the more important for determining income per capita, while productivity growth plays a larger role in comparing growth rates. Economists calculate that 56% of the variation of income per capita among countries is due to differences in production factors, while the remaining 44% is due to productivity. Conversely for growth rates across countries, 65% of the variation is due to productivity growth, while the remaining is from factor accumulation.18 Developing nations often realize almost all of their growth through capital accumulation, which is limited and subject to regional competition as outlined above. In contrast, the East Asian growth economies, on average, experienced productivity growth beyond the normal for developing countries.
A look at cross-country data comparing investment rates and growth in human capital rates shows that the East Asian regions does not strongly diverge from the global averages. However, looking at growth rates of Total Factor Productivity around the world tell a more interesting story. Nearly one third of low and middle-income countries experienced negative TFP growth rates from 1960-1989. The vast majority of the growth by developing nations was purely from factor accumulation. In East Asia, however, countries such as Hong Kong, Japan, and Taiwan experienced TFP “catch up” of 2.0%, 1.0%, and .8% respectively, meaning that they increased that percentage faster than TFP growth in developed nations. While some nations were not as rapid (namely Singapore with a lagging -3.5% catch up rate), compared to other regions such as Africa and South America, East Asia was on average very successful.19
In addition to consistent productivity growth, East Asian nations have also shown surprising resilience to macroeconomic obstacles and contractions. The data shows that after periods of contractions, the East Asian growth economies have bounced back faster and more completely to original levels of productivity growth compared to other developing economies.20
A growing body of evidence suggests that Asia's productivity advantage is derived from their export oriented integration. Though causality is difficult to prove, data shows that manufactured export performance and increased rates of TFP growth are strongly correlated. Interestingly, the data also shows that this relationship is made stronger by a higher level of educational attainment in a country. One analysis of this is that an economy that is able to learn new techniques and technologies is able to adapt them more easily through having an outward oriented export economy. Knowledge can be seen as a spillover effect of FDI.21 Through implementing EOI strategy at staggered times, East Asian nations were able to not only transfer investment, but also technology, knowledge, and global best practices (See Figure 5).
It should be noted that although EOI had an immense impact on the development of East Asian nations, it is dubious to what extent the centrally-planned aspect of EOI affected growth. For example, Japan and Korea implemented complicated incentive schemes and export quotas in industries chosen to have global comparative advantage. Those specific industries did not experience TFP growth beyond that of other industries which had not been selected. Conversely, Hong Kong did not use such selective top-down strategies, and South East Asian interventionist strategies also met with little success.
According to analysis by John Page for the National Bureau of Economic Research, more important than picking winner and loser industries was setting up incentives and criteria of success geared towards export, rather than just volume of output, no matter the industry.22 For example in Taiwan, the government actively threatened removal of tariff protection as punishment for poor export quality and low productivity. In Japan, the incentive system, although convoluted in enforcement, made for clear overall industrial goals— businessmen from all manufacturing industries were well aware of what the criteria of success were.23 This cast doubts upon Singapore's strong centrally planned economy with state-run actors. Data shows that almost all of Singapore's growth is due to input growth, rather than increased productivity. This may be connected with their interventionist policies.24 Contrast this with the laissez-faire Hong Kong approach, which promotes aggressive industrial exportation without little market intervention and has reaped rewards in terms of relatively easy pivots to new developmental stages and high productivity growth rates.25
In spite of this, the domestic institutions of all these countries deserve much credit for the economic growth, regardless of the approach taken. By setting strategies focused on international trade and protecting against foreign institutional influence, East Asian nations has been able to coordinate the largest growth in human history, bringing more people out of poverty than ever before. High investment in regions around the world has often lead to high levels of corruption. It can lead to vicious circles where those institutions who benefit from corruption have the most power to maintain the status quo, such as can be witnessed in North Korea. In most East Asian nations, however, there are signs that economic growth has created the opposite effect—a virtuous circle—whereby growth leads to greater freedom and economic inclusiveness, which in turn leads to more growth.26 These governments were able to maintain stable macroeconomic environments, allocate resources efficiently, attract foreign investment, maintain a high level of educational attainment, and effectively build infrastructure. Though their economic growth was assisted by the draft from the geese ahead, this diverse group of nations were able to implement the new knowledge and resources to produce substantive, balanced growth. This deserves praise from developed nations and study from the developing.
Looking into the future, the dangers and obstacles facing East Asia are still numerous and looming. One of the major weaknesses of EOI and the Flying Geese Model is dependency on foreign markets and investment. Japan has been in a state of stagnation for two decades, with productivity languishing at just 67% of the United States.27 One of the factors in this stagnation was the Plaza Accord of 1985, which allowed the US dollar to rapidly depreciate against the yen. This made Japanese exports more expensive, and made US imports more competitive in the Japanese market. Additionally, it exposed many of the underlying structural flaws of an economy that so biased towards exports for so long. Subsequently, Japan has been unable to make the pivot beyond the high tech industry, as wages have stagnated. This forced the Asian Tigers to diversify elsewhere, Hong Kong becoming a services base for China and the Pearl River manufacturing engine, while Singapore has done the same for South East Asia.
A similar threat is currently facing China, with the US putting significant pressure on the Chinese government to appreciate the renminbi to the dollar. Like Japan, appreciation of the yuan might expose similar flaws, such as the real estate bubble, and smother an economy dependent on export industry.28 China is currently making the transition into higher-level of innovation industry, exemplified by companies like Huawei, which does communication technology, and Lenovo,29 which focuses on high-tech hardware such as servers and laptops. In spite of these two bright points, much of the country is still dependent on low-skill manufacturing, which is slowly relocating to South East Asia due to higher Chinese wages. It also seems that China's numerous State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are too inflexible to transition to more capital-intensive, innovation industries. Efforts are being made by the transitioning government to mitigate SOEs role in the economy, but experts are dubious whether these entrenched companies, and the banking system that supports them, can be extracted.30 Additionally, economists such as Paul Krugman have expressed doubts about whether China's growth can be attributed to temporary factor accumulation or substantive growth in productivity.31 Even if it is the latter, higher wages due to higher productivity presents the challenge of less manufacturing jobs available to employ their large migrant population.32 As China faces down or succumbs to the various obstacles in its path, it will become more obvious whether its ascent of the development ladder is sustainable.
Nevertheless, these obstacles have not stopped many experts from heralding the 21st century The Asian Century.33 Growth in East Asia has already produced positive effects in South Asia, Africa, South America and developing regions across the globe, and Asia will hopefully continue to export development. The advancement of Asia could lead to the rise of the global south as the winds of prosperity blow from one goose economy to the next. Though risky and hardly preordained, the future looks bright for the economies of East Asia.
1Shahid Yusef and Kaoru Nabeshima, Changing the Industrial Geography in Asia: The Impact of China and India. (The Washington DC: The World Bank, 2010) 6.
2HK is now has a post-colonial, semi-democratic government after the handover from the British to the Chinese in 1997. It is now semi-autonomous under the 1 Country 2 Systems agreement with China. Regarless, much of it's growth occurred during the colonial period, and the handover had less effect than most experts predicted.
3David N. Weil, Economic Growth. 2nd ed.(Boston, MA: Pearson Education Inc, 2009), 11-13.
4David Weil. 70.
5Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations. (Penn State University Electronics Classics Series, 2005), 522.
6John Page, The East Asian Miracle: Four Lessons for Development Policy. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1994, Volume 9 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 254.
7John Page 261.
8Yusef and Nabeshima, 4.
9Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy. 9th Edition (Boston, MA: Addison Wesley, 2012), 148.
10Kiyoshi Kojima, The “ﬂying geese” model of Asian economic development: origin, theoretical extensions, and regional
policy implications. Journal of Asian Economics 11 (Journal of Asian Economics, 2000), 379.
11Dr. Ozawa also names these five stages after corresponding economic theorists. Stage 1 with Hecksher-Ohlin, stage 2 with Adam Smith, stage 3 with Henry Ford, stage 4 with Joseph Schumpeter, and stage 5 with Marshall McLuhan. (Ozawa 13)
12Terutomo Ozawa, The (Japan-Born) “Flying-Geese” Theory of Economic Development Revisited—and Reformulated from a Structuralist Perspective. Center on Japanese Economy and Business Working Paper Series, October 2010, No.291 (New York, NY: Columbia University School of Business) 11.
13I would add to Dr. Ozawa's list the development of the Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Engineering, and Consulting industries as key to an advanced economy. These services may be either treated as a 6th, post-industrial stage of growth, such as exhibited by the economy of Hong Kong, or as a concurrent development ladder in the services sector.
14Kiyoshi Kojima, 376.
15The middle income trap represents specifically the transition point from low-level manufacturing to higher-skill industry. It is seen as developing between $1000-$2000 per capita income. For more on this effect in Asia see: http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/12/asias-middle-income-trap/
16Raymond Vernon, International Trade and International Investment in the Product Cycle. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 80 No. 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, May 1966)
17Terutomo Ozawa, 5.
18David Weil, 204.
19John Page, 232. TFP and capital stock estimates are both very difficult measurements. One should view the original publication for a more detailed view of NBER's methodology. For more information on the difficulties of calculating capital stock and productivity growth, see David Weil, 195.
20John Page, 246.
21John Page, 260.
22John Page, 266.
23David Weil, 353.
24David Weil, 195.
25Yusef and Nabeshima, 4.
26Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. (New York, NY: Crown Publishers, 2012), 121-139.
27David Weil, 194.
28Kenneth Rapoza, For Chinese Yuan, China Knows Best. Forbes, Published 5/8/2011. Accessed: 10/8/2012. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/05/08/for-chinas-yuan-china-knows-best/>
29Lenovo is technically incorporated in Hong Kong, though it was founded in Beijing and much of its manufacturing is still in the mainland.
30See China's State Owned Enterprises Defend Further Growth. AsiaONE Business, Reuters, for an article on the risky loans to SOEs and Kevin Yao's China Cabinet Seeks Ambitious Economic Reform Agenda: Advisors. Reuters, Beijing, CN, for the announcement of a plan by the central Chinese government for mitigating the power of SOEs, expected in December.
31Economic data for the PRC is notoriously unclear and unreliable, so analysts have trouble even agreeing on which numbers can be looked at.
32This is already occurring. According to the China Labour Statistical Yearbook 2007, manufacturing jobs went from 98 million to 83 million in the period from 1995 to 2002. (Yusef and Nabeshima, 38)
33Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century, Asian Development Bank, August 2011, <http://www.adb.org/publications/asia-2050-realizing-asian-century>.
Figure 1a: Comparison of a developing nation's product when introduced to world markets with a pre-existing economy of scale. (In Krugman's example the Swiss have an established industry in watches, while Thailand has lower potential production costs but a higher initial cost.)
Figure 1b: This graph shows the downward sloping cost curve for economies of scale, both external and internal.
Source: Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy. 9th Edition (Boston, MA: Addison Wesley, 2012), 148, 143.
Figure 2: Model of the Flying Geese Pattern of Industrial Development, the M-P-E cycle
Source: Kiyoshi Kojima, The “ﬂying geese” model of Asian economic development: origin, theoretical extensions, and regional policy implications. Journal of Asian Economics 11 (Journal of Asian Economics, 2000), 378.
Source: Terutomo Ozawa, The (Japan-Born) “Flying-Geese” Theory of Economic Development Revisited—and Reformulated from a Structuralist Perspective. Center on Japanese Economy and Business Working Paper Series, October 2010, No.291 (New York, NY: Columbia University School of Business), Figure 1.
Figure 4: As a nation rationalizes it's industry, it moves to a higher production curve (from b to b*) through production innovations and “learning-by-doing.” This is a Hicks-neutral process. The other path to growth is through production of factor-intensive product. In this case, an industry will produce labor intensive a1, because the lambda line is biased towards labor. As a country wages rise they can shift from a1 to a2 and from b1 to b2 according to the upward shift in the lambda line.
Source: Kiyoshi Kojima, The “ﬂying geese” model of Asian economic development: origin, theoretical extensions, and regional policy implications. Journal of Asian Economics 11 (Journal of Asian Economics, 2000), 381.
Source: Industrial Development Report 2005: Capability Building for catching-up: Historical, Empirical and policy dimensions. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2005), 19.
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. (New York, NY: Crown Publishers, 2012).
Kiyoshi Kojima, The “ﬂying geese” model of Asian economic development: origin, theoretical extensions, and regional
policy implications. Journal of Asian Economics 11 (Journal of Asian Economics, 2000).
Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy. 9th Edition (Boston, MA: Addison Wesley, 2012).
Terutomo Ozawa, The (Japan-Born) “Flying-Geese” Theory of Economic Development Revisited—and Reformulated from a Structuralist Perspective. Center on Japanese Economy and Business Working Paper Series, October 2010, No.291 (New York, NY: Columbia University School of Business).
John Page, The East Asian Miracle: Four Lessons for Development Policy. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1994, Volume 9 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Kenneth Rapoza, For Chinese Yuan, China Knows Best. Forbes, Published 5/8/2011. Accessed: 10/8/2012. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/05/08/for-chinas-yuan-china-knows-best/>
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations. (Penn State University Electronics Classics Series, 2005).
Raymond Vernon, International Trade and International Investment in the Product Cycle. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 80 No. 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, May 1966)
David N. Weil, Economic Growth. 2nd ed.(Boston, MA: Pearson Education Inc, 2009).
Kevin Yao, China Cabinet Seeks Ambitious Economic Reform Agenda: Advisors. Reuters, Beijing, CN. Published: 10/21/12. Accessed: 11/8/12. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/21/us-china-economy-reforms-idUSBRE89K0GS20121021>
Shahid Yusef and Kaoru Nabeshima, Changing the Industrial Geography in Asia: The Impact of China and India. (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2010).
Asia 2050: Realizing the Asian Century, Asian Development Bank, August 2011, <http://www.adb.org/publications/asia-2050-realizing-asian-century>.
China's State Owned Enterprises Defend Further Growth. AsiaONE Business, Reuters. Published: 11/9/12. Accessed: 11/9/12 <http://news.asiaone.com/A1Business/General%2BNews/Story/A1Story20121109-382556.html>
Industrial Development Report 2005: Capability Building for catching-up: Historical, Empirical and policy dimensions. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2005), 19. <http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/import/44686_IDR05_withoutCovers.pdf>